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International Human Rights and the 
International Law Project: The Revolving 
Door of Academic Discourse and  
Practitioner Politics 
MAXWELL O. CHIBUNDU* 
 
Anniversaries are moments of reflection.  In the best of the 
tradition, one looks backwards not simply to recapture the moment of 
creation, but to see how much the visions of the creators have turned 
into reality.  The retrospective gaze thus is valuable as a pedagogic 
tool.  Anniversaries are also moments for seeking to chart course 
corrections; that is to say, for renewal and, possibly, reorientation.  A 
panel devoted to critique and evaluation is required simultaneously to 
engage in both. 
In addition to being the 60
th
 anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 2008 was a personal 
anniversary of sorts.  I had my introduction into the legal academy in 
the Fall of 1988.  We were at the tail end of the discursive project of 
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, and just beginning to take 
seriously the notion that personal histories and stories were valid 
tools in legal research and commentary.1  One of the few perquisites 
 
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.  I would like to thank and extend my 
congratulations to the members of this founding Editorial Board of the Maryland Journal of 
International Law for making the restoration of the Journal a reality, and for their excellent 
editorial assistance with what follows.  The remaining errors, of course, are mine. 
1. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, 
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989); Richard K. 
Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 543 (1988).  
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of the profession is to attend conferences that are more or less paid 
for by one’s employer.  I readily recall my second conference.  It was 
sponsored by the American Society of International Law, which was 
then looking for ways of making itself again relevant to the 
propagation of international law in the United States, an undertaking, 
it should be said, that it has succeeded handily in doing.  Regardless 
of the topic under discussion at the conference (e.g., writing about 
and/or the teaching of Public International Law, the place of 
International Economic Law in the curriculum, getting published in 
―mainstream‖ journals, library acquisition policies for international 
law, and the like), the persistent and constant refrain was the 
―marginalization‖ of international law within the academy.2  A new 
entrant, I could scarcely have imagined a less auspicious start.  And 
yet, as we now can say with complete confidence, 1989 marked the 
start of a new order in international relations and international law.  
The structuring of the politics of the post-Cold War world order, 
international concern and cooperation over the environment, the 
emergence of a significantly enlarged and deepened European 
Community, the emergence of an economically dynamic China, and a 
more ambitious take on trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round on 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were all looming on the 
horizon, and were to usher in unprecedented material for international 
law scholarship over the next two decades.  But no one topic in 
international law has held the imagination of international lawyers 
during these decades as have issues related to what has come to be 
termed ―International Human Rights,‖ and the UDHR is undoubtedly 
the birth mother of its current conception.   
Although a student of international law, I am not a particularistic 
scholar of international human rights.  I shall therefore take 
advantage of the tripartite confluence of the restart of the Maryland 
Journal of International Law, the University of Maryland School of 
Law’s celebration of the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the 
UDHR, and the occasion of my now indisputable attainment of the 
age of majority as a law school teacher to ruminate on the ways the 
 
2. Many suggestions at the conference related to collaborative cross-disciplinary research 
and writing by international law academics with other academics such as those involved in 
the study of international relations and international economics—suggestions that were taken 
up by many legal scholars whose works are now well mainstreamed in the legal academy.  
Indeed, there is now a journal dedicated to the intersections of International Law and 
International Relations, the Journal of International Law and International Relations. 
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objectives and methods of international human rights scholarship 
intersect with and influence the broader liberal internationalist project 
in the making of a postmodern international legal order.  In the 
process, I shall try to say something about the possible lessons of the 
trajectory of human rights discourse from the UDHR to Guantánamo 
Bay, the significance for that discourse of the increased participation 
of human rights ―activists‖ and ―practitioners‖ as instructors in the 
legal academy, and provide some reflections on what these relation-
ships say about the teaching to and consumption of human rights 
discourse by our students.  The story that I shall tell will differ, I 
think, in some important ways from much of the received wisdom 
that is often passed on in International Human Rights courses from 
one class of students to the next, but I believe it is just as accurate, 
and if it helps spur reflection among our students, then I shall have 
achieved the objective of my participation on this panel.  
FROM THE UDHR TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY 
The idea of human rights, like those of ―truth,‖ ―justice,‖ and 
―peace‖ (and, as this is largely an American audience, one might add 
―motherhood and apple pie‖), is, as clearly evidenced by the 
presentations in this conference, beloved by all.  And yet, few are (or, 
at least, ought to be) content to rest on the obvious goodness of all 
who tout human rights, and the equally clear evil of those who flout 
it.  The shrillness with which the assertion of, and opposition to, its 
undifferentiated ―universality‖ are sometimes articulated, and the 
defensiveness with which its pedigree is proclaimed or denied 
suggests some level of anxiety about what it means to believe in or 
subscribe to an idea.  Only those who believe that there are inherently 
good or bad persons, good or bad societies, good or bad cultures find 
it easy to dismiss disagreements about human rights in Manichaean 
terms.  A more helpful explanation for those disagreements, notwith-
standing a general trans-cultural commitment to the ―inherent dignity 
of the person,‖ is that there is in fact a broad gulf between liking an 
idea or concept and implementing it.  An idea—at least one that is 
deemed to be ―progressive‖—must challenge the distribution of 
power and resources in a given place and time, while its implemen-
tation, if it is to succeed, must be reconciled with those very realities.  
The method for mounting the challenge and for effecting the 
reconciliation vary with intellectual disciplines, among lawyers and 
philosophers deconstructing and applying a particularized text is 
23 CHIBUNDU (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2009  2:32 PM 
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central to the process. 
And here lies the central relevance of the UDHR for international 
human rights.  It may be that the pedigree of contemporary 
international human rights commences with the intellectual ferment 
of Enlightenment Europe, as expressed by such authors as Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant and the declarations of the French Revolution;3 
or, it may be that the pedigree dates further back to the writings of the 
Canonists of Bologna in the late European ―Middle Ages‖4 or even to 
the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and the Greeks.5  Nor 
does one necessarily have to subscribe to the view of the privileging 
of human rights over other values being either exclusively occidental 
or otherwise in order to accept the special place the UDHR has in the 
canon of human rights claims.  Its primary value is that unlike any of 
these other iterations, the UDHR speaks directly and in contemporary 
prose to the concerns of our moment.  It speaks to the claims for 
humane governance that members of post-World War II societies 
have vis-à-vis those who exercise political control over their lives.  
The Declaration does affirm ―the inherent dignity and . . . the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,‖ but it 
does so not as an end in and of itself, but as the basis for ―freedom, 
justice and peace.‖6 
Nor does the UDHR simply dwell on announcing lofty ideals.  To 
the contrary, it is highly particularistic in fitting those ideals within its 
own temporal and spatial environment.  Obviously the product of the 
concerns generated by the waging of World War II and the politics of 
the Great Depression that had preceded it, the UDHR proclaims that 
―freedom from fear and want‖ is the ―highest aspiration of the 
common people.‖7  It tells us that mass disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts that have outraged the 
conscience of humankind, and that we need the rule of law to protect 
human rights so that ―man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as 
 
3. In this symposium issue, for example, see Peter G. Danchin, Who Is the “Human” in 
Human Rights?  The Claims of Culture and Religion, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009). 
4. See, e.g., James Griffin, Are Human Rights Parochial?, in PAROCHIALISM AND 
DIFFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mortimer Sellers ed., forthcoming 2009). 
5. Cf. Hirad Abtahi, Reflections on the Ambiguous Universality of Human Rights: Cyrus 
the Great’s Proclamation as a Challenge to the Athenian Democracy’s Perceived Monopoly 
on Human Rights, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55 (2007); Danchin, supra note 3. 
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
7. Id. pmbl. 
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a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.‖8  Further-
more, considerations of realpolitik are squarely presented as 
justifications for the announcement of these rights.  Thus, the 
Declaration asserts that because it is essential to promote the develop-
ment of friendly relations among states, and because members of the 
United Nations not only have affirmed under the Charter the inherent 
dignity and equal rights of all persons (men and women alike), but 
also have committed themselves ―to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom,‖ the UDHR thus stands as 
―a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.‖9 
This is the backdrop for its prescriptions.  Strikingly, they are not 
articulated as commands or even instructions, but as urgings:  
[E]very individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and 
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure 
their universal and effective recognition and observance, both 
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among 
the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.10   
Equally striking (and again as a reflection of the ethos of the 
moment), the provisions of the UDHR do not merely encourage the 
recognition of those libertarian principles or ―freedoms‖ that 
simultaneously promote collective self-governance while constrain-
ing the powers of the resulting government, they also articulate an 
affirmatively socialized vision of the role of government in providing 
material resources for the welfare of the community.  These 
approaches embody not so much a generalized vision of the 
relationship of the individual to the state that transcends time and 
space, but the particular experiences of mid-20
th
 century socio-
economic politics.  Thus, the UDHR does not simply assert some 
generalized vision of liberty, equality, or fraternity, but takes the 
trouble to spell out in quite specific terms a particularized conception 
of human dignity that is firmly rooted in the historical events and 
mindsets of the epoch of its crafting.  It grounds its faith in the 
efficacy of human rights as a means for doing away with the 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
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injustices of non-participatory politics,11 unequal distribution of 
wealth,12 and impermissible discrimination on account of religion, 
race, language, sex, nationality, or, notably, ―property, birth or 
status.‖13  
To acknowledge the explicitness and specificity of the text is not to 
frame that text as a set of legal commands.  To the contrary, in many 
ways, the genius of the UDHR lies in its ability to capture, present, 
and recommend these broad aspirations not as legal obligations, but 
as goals that are worth striving for within a collaborative framework.  
This model of persuasion may be contrasted with an alternative 
model—that of coercion—in which behavior is hierarchically 
decreed and, whenever possible, coercively enforced.  The debate 
between these two competing models for understanding the UDHR, I 
want to suggest, is emblematic of a much broader debate within the 
discourse of the modern international law project.  Furthermore, as I 
shall show, the move from the one to the other is dictated as much by 
a sense of material power as by any depth of moral commitment to 
the principles at issue. 
That the lawyers, diplomats, and politicians who crafted the 
UDHR operated within the persuasive model of international rela-
tions is borne out not only by the text of the declaration, but also by 
the history of the international human rights project in the wake of 
the UDHR.  Beyond the aspirational statements of the UDHR, the 
Project contemplated the negotiation, adoption, and enforcement of 
legally binding treaties and covenants.  These actions were premised 
on the notion of law as the product of good-faith cooperation among 
and cooptation of states.  The underlying assumption was that states 
were equally desirous of coexisting in a peaceful international society 
and that the function of international law was to provide the order 
within which that coexistence can occur.  The nature of the state, and 
 
11. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 6, arts. 3–5 (right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person), arts. 6–12 (right to equal protection under law), arts. 13–21 (right to privacy, 
movement, free association, self-expression, self-definition, and full participation in the 
political life of one’s national community), arts. 27–28 (right to education and to the 
enjoyment of the cultural life and scientific advances of the community). 
12. Id. arts. 22–26 (right to work, just remuneration, ―equal pay for equal work,‖ social 
security, rest and leisure, a standard of living adequate to the maintenance of health and 
well-being, and, for mothers and children, the right to ―special care and assistance‖). 
13. Id. art. 2 (―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.‖). 
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particularly the concept of sovereignty, rendered unlikely the oper-
ation within international society of an Austinian conception of law.  
Of necessity then, law, if it were to exist within international society, 
had to be arrived at through the willing and voluntary cooperation of 
states rather than coerced compliance.   
The Human Rights Project thus proceeded by negotiating and 
urging the adoption of treaties and covenants.  Some were a lot easier 
to obtain than others.  Reflecting the immediate experiences of the 
international society that had just waged a scorched-earth war, the 
Conventions on Genocide,14 on the methods for the waging of war 
(―Geneva Conventions‖),15 and on treatment of refugees16 were 
readily negotiated and widely adopted.  But despite the broad acclaim 
of the aspirational statements of the UDHR, negotiating and adopting 
the implementing Covenants proved to be a much more prolonged 
undertaking.  It is worth pausing to ask why this was so, for in the 
answers may lie some lessons not only for human rights lawyers, but 
also for international law scholars and practitioners of our current 
moment. 
Among human rights scholars, it is commonplace to attribute the 
long gestation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on the geopolitics of relations 
between the ―East‖ (i.e., states dominated by the Soviet Union), and 
the ―West‖ (i.e., members of the various alliances cobbled by the 
United States).  These two groups, it is said, differed over the 
primacy of rights, with the West preferring to give preeminence to 
civil and political rights, while the East sought to privilege economic 
rights.  The adoption of two covenants, rather than a single unified 
treaty, is thus presented as a compromise, with the UDHR standing in 
as the authentic and definitive statement of what an undivided and 
 
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
15. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
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non-politicized international community genuinely wanted.  As with 
any conventional wisdom, one can doubtless muster support for this 
view, but only by ignoring or overlooking other trends that were at 
play.   
At its core, the horrors experienced in the waging of World War II 
(including the holocaust and the mass displacements of whole 
population groups), and the socio-economic upheavals leading up to 
it, made addressing human rights concerns in the wake of the war 
virtually unavoidable.  Yet, enshrining moral norms as legal rules 
demands the existence of a particular kind of society—a political 
community.  The shared experiences of the war, buttressed by the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and of course the formation of the 
United Nations, initially may have provided the illusion that inter-
national society indeed had congealed into a political community, but 
the unreality of the illusion was manifested not only by the existence 
of aggressively competing political economic and military blocs, but 
also by the emergence and maturation of new members and interests 
within the international society.   
The evidence of the effects of the multipolarization of issues and 
interests on the human rights agenda is perhaps best reflected by the 
paucity of academic writings on international human rights as a focus 
of intellectual concern during the two-and-a-half decades between the 
UDHR and the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe.17  Nor can the dearth of such writings be 
attributed to a general decline during that period in the study of inter-
national law.  Numerous other issues, notably those relating to the 
use of force, collective security, decolonization, self-determination, 
the regulation of foreign investments, national control over natural 
resources, and international involvement in civil wars all commanded 
substantially more attention than did the study of human rights.  
Indeed, the modern era of human rights, after the initial outpouring 
typified by the UDHR and the Genocide Convention, genuinely can 
be dated to the Helsinki Declaration.  A puzzle worth asking and 
seeking to resolve, then, is what explains the quiescence of 
international human rights discourse between 1950 and 1975, and its 
resurgence—and more importantly, sustenance—since then?  For 
reasons that I shall put forward later in this piece, the answer to this 
 
17. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 
I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Final Act]. 
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puzzle is vital for any meaningful prognostication of the future of 
human rights in our current international environment of economic 
turmoil and transition in the distribution of moral and political power.  
The answer to the puzzle, however deftly human rights proponents 
have sought to avoid it, says a lot not only about human rights 
discourse, but the international law project generally.  That answer 
essentially is that if there is any truth to the claim that law and legal 
institutions invariably reflect the distribution and structures of power 
within a society, this is especially the case for international law, and 
trebly so for international human rights discourse.  This is, of course, 
a far cry from the dominant perspective among celebrants of the 
human rights movement.  International human rights law is often 
presented as an innately moral and altruistic undertaking that challen-
ges power.  But, as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating; 
so, let’s have a quick bite by reviewing the post-World War II 
trajectory of international human rights discourse. 
The insubstantiality of international human rights literature be-
tween 1950 and 1975 reflected the relative absence of its discourse in 
the corridors of power.  To be sure, lawyers and diplomats within the 
Secretariat and the Legal Committee of the General Assembly and 
those negotiating the texts of the ICCPR and ICESCR were repre-
sentatives of the power structure, as were the politicians and 
diplomats who occasionally invoked human rights rhetoric and norms 
in the decolonization, anti-apartheid, and ―national liberation‖ 
struggles.  But their place and influence on the totem pole of power 
structures in international relations were essentially invisible when 
compared to the rhetoric and demands for ―self determination,‖ 
―political independence,‖ ―territorial integrity,‖ economic national-
ism, and the sovereign rights of the state.  Nor were the states of the 
West in any position to be vigorous advocates of human rights.  
France and the United Kingdom, as exiting colonial powers, often 
adopted recognizably anti-human rights practices, whether in Malaya, 
Kenya, or Algeria; and the United States, as the successor imperial 
state, found its mouth firmly glued shut by its internal racial 
discrimination practices and the increasingly anti-human rights 
policies it employed in the conduct of its wars in South-East Asia.  
By 1974, however, these Western powers had more or less success-
fully extricated themselves from these shackles and could now front 
as protectors of universal human rights.  The initial framework was 
straightforwardly political.   
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The Helsinki Final Act was part of the package of détente or 
―rapprochement‖ between the Soviet Bloc and the members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  One of its seminal achievements 
was to provide a legitimate human rights platform for the Western 
states’ criticisms of the emigration policies of the Soviet Union 
regarding Jews wishing to leave that country for Israel or the West.18  
This seeming concession by a ―superpower‖—that its regulation of 
the ―right‖ of its nationals to emigrate to other countries was a proper 
subject of international discourse—indubitably created a chink in the 
hitherto absolutist position that many non-Western states had taken 
regarding the meaning and scope of the non-interference language of 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.  Events within the United 
States made it possible to convert this concession into the flood of 
human rights claims that significantly shaped international law 
discourse over the last generation. 
In August 1974, a president of the United States resigned his office 
in order to avoid involuntary removal.  The Congress became 
effectively the most influential branch of the United States Govern-
ment and it launched numerous investigations, the results of which 
revealed extensive political corruptions dating over several decades 
in the conduct of United States foreign policies.  Of particular 
significance were the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and of several large multinational corporations, whose conduct often 
seemed to align United States institutions with governments and 
persons thought to be immoral, unjust, or undemocratic.  The 1976 
elections confirmed the extent to which the American population had 
become dissatisfied with its government.  The Democratic Party, seen 
since the 1930s as the more liberal and reform-minded of the two 
dominant parties, scored substantial victories.  Even more impor-
tantly, a little known governor from the South, who openly cam-
paigned on his moral probity and his belief in the equal and civil 
rights of all, was elected president.  The Congress and the President 
were now united in a desire to imbue the practice of American 
politics with moral considerations.  The creation of an Office for 
Human Rights within the Department of State was one consequence, 
thereby institutionalizing an advocacy center for the promotion of 
 
18. Although the Final Act for the most part reaffirmed the then-standard clichés of 
East–West relations on ―sovereignty‖ and the terms for ―friendly relations‖ among states, it 
was notable for its provisions on the movement of peoples across borders on the basis of, 
inter alia, ―humanitarian‖ considerations.  Id.   
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international human rights within the United States foreign policy 
establishment. 
The politics of morality did not last.  By 1980, ―realism‖ had again 
returned to center stage in thinking about the conduct of American 
foreign relations.19  The election of President Reagan, who viewed the 
Soviet Union as ―the evil empire‖ (and one of whose notable pre-
election on-camera gaffes was counting down to the unleashing of 
bombs on that country), symbolized the reversion.  Nor was this a 
uniquely American phenomenon.  The British had rejected a year 
earlier a weak Labour Party in favor of the Conservative Party led by 
―the Iron Lady,‖ Margaret Thatcher.  France and Germany were 
headed by nominally social democratic parties that were in fact 
highly pragmatic and often worked in coalition with their ostensibly 
more conservative oppositions.  In short, this was the age of 
―realism,‖ when there was in large measure—at least in the West—a 
yearning for a return to Henry Kissinger’s brand of ―realpolitik.‖  It 
may then be validly asked why there was not, at least in matters of 
human rights, a reversion to the pre-1974 status quo.  Why did not 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Carter Administration, like the UDHR 
and the Genocide Convention, constitute simply another ―Prague 
Spring‖ for the cause of international human rights?   
The answer lies in the differences between the zeitgeist that shaped 
the power politics of the 1980s and 1990s, on the one hand, and that 
which had been dominant during the 1950s and 1960s on the other.  
Each zeitgeist, in turn, was formed by facts on the ground.  Two 
resulting structural elements of the interactions between facts and 
ideas are worth focusing on.  The first was the deconstitution of the 
state as the locus of material power and resources, and the second 
was the emergence of private entrepreneurs as possible heirs to the 
exercise of such power. 
In the 1980s, as contrasted with the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet 
Union, and the ideologies that it represented were in decline.  The 
political leadership manifestly was experiencing significant diffi-
culties in its self-renewal and public legitimation.  Central planning 
and economic growth through heavy industrialization had stalled.  It 
had failed to create a consumer society that regularly met the basic 
needs of the population.  Externally, its ability to effectively 
command the obedience, if not loyalty, of client states such as Poland 
 
19. Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
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and Afghanistan were under severe challenge.  Ultimately, the center 
could no longer hold and the 1990s witnessed the disintegration of a 
once ―superpower,‖ with cataclysmic consequences for both the 
USSR and much of Eastern Europe, particularly for minority 
populations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.  The consequence 
of these breakups—especially their handling—was to strengthen the 
rhetoric of the demand for (if not the regime of) international human 
rights. 
What was true about the disintegration of the Soviet Union was 
equally so about the collection of states often referred to as ―the third 
world,‖ ―nonaligned,‖ or ―developing countries.‖  These ―new states‖ 
of the 1950s and 1960s initially offered a lot of promise for the re-
constitution of international society.  Predominantly former colonies 
of Western European powers, these states naturally had been 
expected to ape (if not heartily embrace) the liberal democratic and 
capitalist ethos of their colonizers.  Their automatic requests for 
membership in the United Nations system, and especially in the 
Bretton Woods institutions, initially seemed to bear out these expec-
tations.  By the 1970s, however, few doubted that these expectations 
were illusory.  The internal politics of many of these states were 
anything but liberal democratic.  Most were being run by military 
juntas, ―presidents for life,‖ or ―one party governments‖ whose 
rhetoric, if not actual practice, tended towards ―socialism‖ or 
―communism.‖  These tendencies often were buttressed by the votes 
these states cast in international organizations.  Although nominally 
nonaligned, these votes, whether at the United Nations General 
Assembly, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, the International Labour Organization, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or for the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, seemed intended to favor the East and undercut the 
West.  As the 1980s began and the world found itself in another 
economic crisis, there was little solicitude in the West to bail out 
these autocratic societies.  To the contrary, the economic crisis of the 
1980s offered an opportunity in the West to have these countries cut 
down to size.  The articulation and enforcement of a particularized 
international human rights agenda was one instrument deployed for 
this purpose.  But to understand how that was possible, one other 
feature in the mindset of the 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to that of 
the 1950s and 1960s, needs to be discussed.  That mindset was about 
the appropriate distribution of responsibility in the management of 
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the affairs of a society between governmental institutions and private 
actors. 
As a teacher of International Business Transactions, I find that one 
of those moments for dramatically demonstrating the dynamism of 
international law arrives in the discussion of foreign direct invest-
ments.  It is difficult to convey today to a student whose primary 
concerns relate to the punishment of multinational corporations for 
their antisocial behaviors (such as damage to the environment, 
running sweatshops, or for engaging in bribery and corruption), 
distinguishing between ―green field‖ investments and takeovers 
through ―mergers and acquisitions,‖ protecting intellectual property 
rights, and understanding the uses of the letter of credit, ―project 
financing‖ (or the like), that these topics have not always been the 
primary concerns of international business lawyers.  How does one 
convey what a different legal world she now inhabits from her 
predecessors of the 1960s and 1970s?  It may be that World War II 
was fought to make the world safe for capitalism—at least American 
style—but the vast majority of states came out of the war committed 
to a central place for the government in the ―commanding heights‖ of 
the economy.  During those decades, the Government was not, and 
simply could not, be a ―mere regulator.‖  It had to be actively 
involved in planning and directing the economy, in the ownership of 
essential economic assets, and in reserving to the nationals of the 
country the ownership and control of assets deemed essential for 
national interest and security.  This consensus began to break down in 
the late 1970s, in part as a reaction to the events described in the prior 
two paragraphs of this essay. 
President Carter of the United States began the process of 
―deregulation,‖ and Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom 
followed with ―privatization.‖20  By the early 1980s, President Ronald 
Reagan of the United States no longer represented an outlier position 
when he blithely asserted that ―government is not the solution to our 
problem; government is the problem.‖21  International institutions 
espoused this doctrine.  So-called ―structural adjustment programs‖ 
had as their primary objective cutting governments down to size in 
 
20. I have discussed this subject elsewhere.  See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law and the 
Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1 
(1997). 
21. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://www. 
reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/speech.asp?spid=6. 
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the ―third world.‖22  It was a policy embraced and given intellectual 
heft by the ―Washington Consensus,‖23 and thereafter, in the 1990s, 
became neoliberal orthodoxy.  That orthodoxy wholeheartedly em-
braced ―globalization,‖ seeing in the free movement of capital, goods, 
and ideas the best promise for liberal democracy, which came to be 
seen as the end for which human civilizations had been aiming.24  
Two core theses of the orthodoxy are worth emphasizing: first, the 
best government is that which is least involved in the affairs of 
society; and second, the international order functions best when it 
minimizes the relevance of national boundaries and national political 
institutions to the activities of members of the ―international co-
mmunity.‖  Neoliberalism anchors these values in its privileging of 
―privatization,‖ while proponents of human rights endorse the same 
values in its claim of a universal set of rights that are independent of 
actual commitments by states.   
In conversations with human rights activists and scholars, I am 
struck by the vigor of their protestations at being lumped in the same 
category as proponents of neoliberalism.  I am never entirely sure 
whether such protests are disingenuous or whether they reflect 
genuine unawareness of the shared principles on which both con-
temporary human rights and neoliberal philosophies rest.  That they 
are cut out of the same cloth, it seems to me, is indisputable.  A 
central plank of international human rights at the beginning of the 
1990s was the delegitimization of the state.  Sovereignty, that 
abstraction in which the mystique of state power is often shrouded, 
was seen as the enemy.25  The future of human rights in international 
society was often presented as resting on the activism of ―civil 
society,‖ an amorphous term that embraces virtually any organization 
whose power or influence does not derive directly from the 
government.  In practical terms, however, the opposition was often to 
a particular kind of government: those who were, for any number of 
reasons, out of favor in Washington or London.  The difficulty lay in 
trying to provide sufficiently coherent philosophical generalizations 
 
22. I have also discussed this issue elsewhere.  See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in 
Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serving Palm Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
167 (1997). 
23. See, e.g., James Gathii, Human Rights, the World Bank, and the Washington 
Consensus: 1949–1999, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 144 (2000).  
24. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
25. Cf. Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). 
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to explain those third world governments that were acceptable and 
those that were not.  In time, the appropriate language, such as 
―antidemocratic,‖ ―pariah,‖ and ―rogue,‖ was furnished less by 
human rights scholars than by neoliberals and neoconservatives.   
But the ultimate linking up of human rights with particular 
political preferences endorsed by neoliberalism came in the context 
of so-called ―humanitarian intervention.‖  The trip down this road in 
which human rights proponents heartily espoused the use of force in 
the service of their causes, although predictable, was rather gradual, 
and itself reflects the symbiosis between the agendas of political and 
military might and of ideas in international relations.  International 
human rights scholars and practitioners may initially have seen their 
primary function in terms of persuading governments to comply with 
their legal or moral obligations, through ―shaming‖ by the publication 
of reports, press releases, and peer reviews.  The successes in the 
United States, however, of using the courts to impose civil sanctions 
under the ―Alien Tort Statute‖ for alleged violations of international 
human rights laws and norms,26 and the cooptation of the Security 
Council into creating ad hoc international tribunals to prosecute and 
impose criminal penalties on individuals alleged to have been 
responsible for ―crimes against humanity‖ in the civil strife that 
occurred in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and in Rwanda,27 
opened up new vistas for the enforcement of human rights.  When 
European countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium 
followed suit with attempts to prosecute such renowned purported 
human rights violators as Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and when a 
significant majority of the members of the United Nations through 
the adoption of the Rome Treaty created a permanent court to 
criminally punish, inter alia, notorious violations of human rights 
such as those that had allegedly occurred in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the idea of a punitive human rights enforcement regime 
had become a reality.  Indeed, a common mantra became the need to 
do away with ―impunity‖ for human rights violators.  It seemed but a 
small step to move from coercive judicial enforcement of human 
 
26. See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  See generally M. O. 
Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Adjudication: A Structural 
Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069 (1999). 
27. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 
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rights claims through post hoc litigation to preventive military 
intervention to forestall such violations. 
The ethnically and religiously driven massacres in Rwanda and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the degree of which were at least attributable to 
the passivity of the United Nations ―peacekeeping‖ forces, provided 
easily graspable instances of the horrendous consequences that can 
ensue from seeming international indifference, and suggested the 
possible benefits of vigorous preventive measures.  Human rights 
proponents were thus at the forefront of urging the Security Council 
and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to engage in 
active military intervention to forestall any extensive human rights 
violations in Kosovo.  They took similar positions with regard to the 
various civil wars in Africa, including those in Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and, of course, Darfur in the western part of Sudan.  
But there is good reason to believe that human rights activists have 
come to see intervention as an end, not as a means to some broader 
objective.  Thus, once the occupation has occurred, there appears to 
be a loss of interest in the human rights violations that continue and 
occasionally bubble up to the surface when active fighting resumes.  
While we may hear of a lot of purported human rights violations in 
Darfur, there is a veil of silence with the no-less-egregious violations 
going on in Somalia, and those that go on in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo are surfaced only when news reports about active 
fighting make taking note of them unavoidable. 
Although not immediately self-evident, there is now good reason 
to believe that we may be in the midst of significant changes in our 
conceptualization of human rights—at least, we ought to be.  If such 
a change does occur, it will be because the last half-dozen years have 
been forcing human rights activists to confront, however reluctantly, 
the extent to which over the last two decades their articulations of 
human rights norms and legalities have been grounded on a highly 
particularized and parochial view of violators and victims.  The 
prototype of the human rights violator was a self-appointed ―third 
world‖ dictator and his underlings.  To this group were added party 
leaders, apparatchiks, or religious oligarchies who governed with iron 
fists what effectively were one-party states.  The victims were the 
disfavored opponents—usually presented as ―democrats‖ or ―moder-
ates‖—or socio-cultural minorities or women.  International human 
rights thus stood as a bulwark against the arbitrary and otherwise 
unchecked exercise of totalitarian power by rulers against the ruled in 
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undemocratic societies.  International human rights had to be 
articulated in universal terms because otherwise those who lived in 
democratic societies would lack the legitimacy and standing to speak 
for the silenced voices of the victims of repressive regimes. 
If the so-called ―global war on terrorism‖ has lasting lessons to 
impart, one of them surely has to be the artificiality—indeed 
parochialism—of the standard trope that the violation of human 
rights is a propensity peculiar to dictatorships.  It is impossible to 
deny that much of the conduct of that ―war‖ by unassailably ―liberal 
democratic‖ states runs counter to what typically has been thought of 
as international human rights norms, values, or even rules.28  One of 
the things that is especially worthy of note has to be the extent to 
which human rights scholarship, induced by domestic constitutional 
law scholarship in the West (especially the United States), has in fact 
been forced to engage not simply in debating the moral validity of the 
conduct, but in actually parsing the legal elements of the conduct.  
The consequence has been the nuanced application of texts and 
practices in order to determine the legitimacy of highly dissected and 
particularistic behavior.  In the process, it becomes evident that there 
are differences between norms and rules, morals and law, preferences 
and commands.  Ideas of derogation and of possible justifications for 
derogation, of exigencies and normality, of utilitarianism and 
deontology begin to creep into the discourse.  Because human rights 
concerns are no longer monochromatically about ―them‖ (the 
―other‖), but also about ―us,‖ it becomes less suspect and more 
acceptable to acknowledge the possibilities of difference.  Preachers, 
romantic poets and perhaps politicians may have the license to 
engage in rhetoric in matters relating to ―us,‖ but lawyers typically do 
not.  International human rights lawyers, when they had the field 
entirely to themselves, could breezily avoid having to confront the 
realities of life as lived rather than as imagined; after all, prior to this 
decade, the subjects of the discourse had little voice in shaping the 
discourse.29  That Olympian stance is no longer tenable both because 
the ―other‖ has been given voice by the recent conduct of liberal 
 
28. It serves little purpose here to recite or rehearse the debates about the morality or 
legality of such conducts as ―extraordinary renditions‖/disappearances, preventive 
detentions, ―enhanced interrogation methods‖/torture, ―targeted assassinations‖/extrajudicial 
killings, and the like.  Whole library shelves can now be filled with books and articles that 
take varying positions on these subjects.    
29. See, e.g., MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 
(2002).  See also Chibundu, supra note 26, at 1108–09.  
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democratic states in the ―war‖ against terrorism,30 and because the 
resulting defensiveness of these societies has transformed simplistic 
moralisms into parsed legalities.  Confronted by scholars who operate 
well within the mainstream and the corridors of intellectual and 
political power, human rights scholars can no longer rest on the 
assertion of moral bromides, nor be dismissive of countervailing 
arguments about the need or desirability of exploring necessary trade-
offs between the protections of rights and of other societal virtues.31  
In short, the future of human rights discourse will have to dispense 
with the Manichaean attitude that has long dominated much of its 
discourse.   
A second likely spin-off for human rights discourse on the 
methods adopted in confronting ―terrorism‖ and in waging the allied 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is that they have laid bare for non-
Westerners, as much as for Westerners, in just how much raiment the 
emperor actually is clothed.  The silent voices of the non-Western 
world may reasonably have been presumed to support (or at least 
acquiesce) in the framing of the human rights discourse as long as the 
idea of human rights could, without too much violence to the concept 
of truth, be claimed to be uniformly universal in application.  That 
position can scarcely be maintained following the events in such 
places as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, and the persistence in 
the so-called ―antiterrorism‖ policies of several Western societies of 
differential treatment for alleged violations of such laws on the basis 
of classifications grounded in nationality or religion.32  As has 
become evident in recent years, the internet has reduced the cost and 
opened up the means for mass communication to many well outside 
the main cosmopolitan communication centers.  The extent to which 
these new participants view and treat human rights discourse, either 
as part of their own cultural life or with skeptical (or even outright 
cynical) distrust, will have a lot to say about the future of that 
discourse.  Put another way, it is unlikely that human rights in the 
future will remain an essentially rhetorical discourse carried out 
 
30. The dramatic testimonies of those imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, or 
otherwise ―interrogated‖ as part of the war on terrorism give voice to this ―other.‖  See, e.g., 
Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, 56 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2009) (book 
review). 
31. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2007); TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).  
32. See generally Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God, for Country, for Universalism: 
Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 883 (2004). 
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almost exclusively by and among the elites of the West about the 
goodness and altruism of the privileged for the welfare of the other.  
That discourse will have to engage with and reflect upon the 
multiplicities of realities that exist as a matter of course in the daily 
and routine lives of plural societies.  The extent to which we can 
prepare our students to be informed participants in that discourse is, 
in my view, a relevant determinant of the course the discourse will 
take.  In the remainder of this essay, then, I want to take on two 
issues that seem to me highly relevant in how well current human 
rights scholars, in particular, and international law academics in 
general, can help tutor our students for a legal and social environment 
that I believe is likely to be quite different from that which has 
existed in the last two decades. 
THE PRACTITIONER AS ACADEMIC 
The protection of human rights, as a political ideal, has been 
developed primarily within two discursive disciplines: those of moral 
philosophy and of law.  The former is squarely located within the 
―ivory tower‖ of the academy, the latter less comfortably so.  Law is 
a highly instrumentalist profession.  Its practitioners exist to solve 
practical problems.  Although the training of legal practitioners is 
now an academic undertaking, few lawyers have been entirely 
comfortable with viewing legal issues in abstract or essentially 
conceptual terms.  This tension is evident in conceptions about the 
UDHR and human rights law in general.  I want to suggest that the 
ways in which knowledge about human rights and its possibilities are 
acquired and communicated have been and will continue to be 
consequential for its development. 
The UDHR, I have argued, is fundamentally an aspirational 
document.  Not surprisingly, then, much of the writing about the 
UDHR in particular, and human rights generally, prior to 1966 was 
devoted primarily to the explication of the underlying moral and 
philosophical arguments.  In its seminal 1980 opinion in Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, however, presented international law as a bouillabaisse of 
more or less indistinguishable legal ingredients of which the UDHR 
is, for practical purposes an element.33  The court cursorily shunted 
aside well understood distinctions in international law between policy 
 
33. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980). 
23 CHIBUNDU (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2009  2:32 PM 
328 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:309 
declarations and legally binding pronouncements such as those 
embodied in treaties and customary international law.  This error, 
although subsequently recognized by other courts, has been decisive 
in shaping the understanding of international human rights law in the 
country with the greatest power to coerce compliance.  This doctrinal 
confusion was compounded by a second: under United States 
domestic law, if the grant of authority to a court to hear a category of 
cases necessarily entails the existence of substantive enforceable 
rights under that grant of jurisdiction, how are the substantive 
elements of those rights to be determined?34  The Filártiga case had 
been brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights, a United States 
domestic civil rights litigation boutique that had not previously 
litigated any international law case.  The jurisdictional statute on 
which the claim was grounded was a little-understood historical 
artifact about which there had been virtually no litigation.35  But, in 
the wake of the post-Helsinki human rights fervor, neither substance 
nor jurisdiction could stand in the way of a court that had determined 
that ―[i]n the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations 
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that 
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and 
collective interest,‖ and which therefore concluded: ―Our holding 
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First 
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the 
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.‖36 
Law, of course, is about authority, and judicial opinions furnish 
authoritative text for the exercise of power.  What distinguishes a 
lawyer from a philosopher is often less their commitments to any 
particular vision of society, but that the lawyer believes that she can 
in fact bring that vision into being not simply through the force of 
imagination or argument, but through the coercive use of power that 
her arguments can call into being.  The capacity to do so is an art, one 
that is learned not through solitary engagement with text, but through 
active involvement with society.  The life of the law, Holmes said to 
Harvard students over a century ago, is not logic, but experience.37  
 
34. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The 
resolution of these complex issues remains cloudy almost thirty years later.  See, e.g., Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
35. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 
36. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
37. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897). 
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This mantra has gained particular salience during the last thirty years 
as clinical and so-called ―experiential‖ learning have become core 
features of legal education in the United States.  The Filártiga 
decision and the human rights litigation industry that it spawned 
effectively transformed the UDHR from an aspirational to a legal 
instrument, and the discourse of international human rights became as 
much a practitioner-oriented doctrinal undertaking as a philo-
sophically engaged pedagogy.  The involvement of practitioners, it 
can be said, enhances the credibility of relevant courses, and in part 
explains the flourishing of human rights courses in American law 
schools.  But it may also have weakened the need for philosophical 
engagements with the assertion of rights.  A ―right‖ has become little 
more than what the speaker believes she is entitled to, and 
foundational tools for distinguishing between ―is‖ and ―ought‖ 
amount to little more than, in the best case, who can shout loudest or 
longest, and in most cases, who can command or wield the greater 
coercive power. 
As already explained, the process of active enforcement of human 
rights claims was neither limited to the United States nor to the 
judiciary.  The extension of enforcement in the 1990s to include 
resorting to coercive military and political power (with the use of 
economic sanctions being most favored) was a systemic change not 
only for international human rights, but for international law 
generally.  This gave added credibility to the idea of international law 
as law and undoubtedly has been partly responsible for the place that 
it now has as a central component of legal education.  But this sense 
of empowerment extends beyond the classroom.  The idea of an 
―international community‖ is often invoked as a cellular organism 
that provides a competing center of power for the oppressed within 
national states.  Disciples of this international community supposedly 
form a no-longer ―invisible college‖ of ―transnational networks‖ of 
persons and organizations dedicated to distilling and propagating the 
shared norms and values of international liberalism.  An argument 
can thus be made that since the organization of this conference fits 
within this dominant mold, this writer/participant perhaps ought to 
take seriously the caution of Shakespeare’s Fool in King Lear: ―Let 
go thy hold when a great wheel runs down a hill, lest it break thy 
neck with following it; but the great one that goes up the hill, let him 
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draw thee after.‖38 
And yet, perhaps purely as an academic exercise, this teacher 
cannot help asking if the future of international human rights dis-
course is bound to follow the last twenty years.  That evidence exists 
to suggest that we might be at a fork in the road of the development 
of the international legal order seems indisputable.  If our confidence 
in the ability of liberal ideals to organize the international legal order 
was bolstered by the resilience of the military, political, and 
economic institutions that underpinned it, the extent to which liberal 
states, when under pressure, have kept faith with those ideals over the 
last decade should surely give us some pause about how they—let 
alone other societies—will react in the gathering storms of economic 
and political instabilities.  In any event, I am an academic, and I 
cannot help asking: ―what if . . . ?‖ 
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PEDAGOGY 
In a recent review of books dealing with that most ultimate of 
human rights crimes, genocide, Malcolm Bull succinctly captures the 
dilemma of the effort to regulate not only that crime, but the entire 
human rights project.  ―Feeling that nothing like the Holocaust should 
ever be allowed to happen again, the UN Convention on Genocide 
tried to define exactly what it was that had happened.‖39  But 
consider: ―If someone is sitting in their bedroom planning the 
annihilation of half the population, it is probably better described as 
fantasy than intent.  On the other hand, soldiers who take no prisoners 
when clearing the survivors out of a bombarded village may have no 
sense that they are engaged in anything other than a messy military 
operation, and be quite indifferent to the identity of those they kill.‖40  
So, a legal order that is determined to punish genocide will have to 
decide whether to punish fantasies (a crime of thought), soldiers 
behaving as soldiers in times of war, both, or neither.  One can rely 
on the text, giving it whatever ―reasonable‖ ―good faith‖ inter-
pretation it can bear; essentially ignore the text and purport to be 
―purposive,‖ thereby raising while begging the question of what 
informs and constrains purposiveness; punish all who arguably are 
 
38. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 2, sc. 4. 
39. See Malcolm Bull, Ultimate Choice, LONDON REV. BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2006) (book 
review). 
40. Id. 
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connected with the wrongdoing; or arbitrarily select, on a so-called 
―case by case‖ basis, what interpretive tool to employ in any given 
situation.  In an environment in which instrumentalism is the object, 
and in which one is not concerned with over-deterrence, the last two 
approaches recommend themselves.  As long as one is unable to 
envision oneself or those close to oneself as potential defendants, 
then the last two choices will serve the purpose.  If one can 
conceivably see oneself as a possible defendant, then a vigorous 
argument as to which of the first two makes the better sense should 
ensue.41  But should a lawmaker or interpreter ever situate herself as a 
potential law violator? 
Much of the discourse in international law, and international 
human rights in particular, elide these troublesome questions.  
Retrospectively finding particular practices abhorrent, condemnatory, 
and even subject to the imposition of sanction, there is in inter-
national law argumentation today a tendency to assert that the 
conduct at issue has been inherently and always universally wrong.  
Universal morality is said to provide the lens for international 
legality, at least in the context of human rights.  One encounters in 
these discourses of international law a rather paradoxical attitude.  
Having found a text that superficially seems relevant to an issue that 
they confront, students almost never seem to actually parse the text.  
They take the text as conclusively resolving that issue.  The only 
remaining issue for them is not so much the meaning of the text, but 
where in a legal hierarchy to situate it.   
A quite frequent experience in the classroom, or while sitting as a 
moot court judge, is of a student who argues vigorously and with 
complete self-confidence that the UDHR, in its entirety, is ―jus 
cogens‖ because it contains ―peremptory norms,‖ or that the pro-
visions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women is ―customary international law‖ 
because it has been signed and ratified by a majority of the member 
states of the United Nations.  If you point to a specific provision 
within the UDHR, such as Article 23(1) (―[e]veryone has the right to 
work‖), and the student concedes that such a ―right‖ does not 
 
41. The popularity of the crimes of ―enticement‖ and ―glorification‖ is a testimonial to 
who calls the tunes; surely it is not those who believe that their thoughts and arguments will 
ever be sufficiently controversial to arouse the ire of the powerful.  And so there is freedom 
of speech and thought, but only so long as the position espoused does not stray too far from 
the accepted mean. 
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constitute ―jus cogens,‖ she then either completely abandons the 
argument, or dogmatically maintains that the right exists under law 
even though she is unable to explain the legal source of the right.  
One of the consequences of framing norms as law is thus an 
unfortunate incapacity to distinguish among sources of ―rights,‖ and 
to place those ―rights‖ within their proper context.  Deprived of an 
artificially assumed essentialist position, and operating outside the 
pragmatism that cultural embeddedness unconsciously confers, my 
student finds herself unable to resort to those lawyering skills that 
come to her as second nature in her domestic law classes.  She fails to 
appreciate that in international human rights law, no less than in 
domestic law, she must begin but almost never end with the text; that 
there is nothing intrinsically self-evident about the meaning of text; 
that the text was crafted as a compromise among varied and often 
competing interests; that, as such, texts are expressive but never 
definitive of contested values; and that the appropriate construction 
of any text is as much dependent on time and place as it is on the 
particular terms employed in the text.  This failing, of course, is not 
the student’s alone.  In fact, it is a reflection of the dominant attitude 
of human rights scholars and practitioners to the conduct of 
international human rights discourse.  
One possible consequence of the waning of the post-Cold War 
world order may well be to return to the teacher and her students the 
capacity to interrogate text and to situate it rightfully within the 
socio-cultural milieu that it seeks to regulate.  If so, it would be a 
welcome change. 
The practitioner in the classroom is indisputably a valuable asset in 
the training of international lawyers.  It may be that the current 
tendency of human rights lawyers to be monochromatic in their view 
of human rights is simply a stage in the development of the 
international human rights legal order.  Perhaps as courts confront 
more prosecutions, judges will not compulsively believe that their 
sole duty is to vindicate some uniform and universalized conception 
of human rights, and academic institutions will not continue to 
believe that the only practitioners worth having in their classrooms 
are those who represent the plaintiff or the prosecutor.  In any event, 
it is likely that as different socio-economic orders are able to mount 
meaningful challenges to the idea of what constitutes international 
power and success, the vision of international law, as it has in the 
past, will change accordingly.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Sixty years of the development of international human rights under 
the auspices of the UDHR, at a minimum, suggest the following.  
First, the UDHR is better seen as a set of principles, not a legal 
decree.  We ought to take seriously its invitation for the participation 
of all, not simply the elite or the materially well off, in negotiating 
accommodations among a full range of claims that make possible the 
enjoyment of peace, security, and happiness within a just inter-
national order.  Secondly, respect for the dignity of the person exists 
not in the coercive compulsion of compliance, but in the persuasive 
explication of why the particular respect being sought or accorded is 
in the interest of the particular person or group.  If international 
human rights are to serve worthy purposes, the concept of ―human 
dignity‖ must not become another one of those vacuous vessels into 
which, in the name of altruism, particularistic preferences are 
asserted as ―law,‖ but should reflect the actual conditions within 
which peoples struggle to make sense of their daily existence.  This 
exhortation is no less true in dealing with societies than it is in 
dealing with individuals.  The reality is that whether we choose to 
accept it or not, the ―dignity‖ of the individual cannot be wrenched 
from the sense the individual feels about respect for the community 
of which she is a part, whether that membership is by choice, by 
prescription, or by affect.  Thirdly, precisely because human rights 
are as much about interests as they are about ideas, institutions, and 
practices, it behooves human rights scholars and practitioners 
(including the students and acolytes whose views they seek to shape) 
to think and learn about social realities that transcend their own 
parochial perspectives of what constitutes the good or the bad.  
Human rights scholars are not avenging angels.  They should be 
engaged participants in a much broader discourse that explores not 
only politics and moral philosophy, but history, economics, socio-
logy, religion, culture, and the full range of the humanities.  This 
requires an approach to the idea of human dignity not as a mono-
chromatic exercise in the resolution of conflicts between the 
individual and the pariah state, but a deeper and often necessarily 
sympathetic and particularistic understanding of the conflicts and 
accommodations with which persons and societies are regularly 
engaged, and which is intrinsic in the process of living.  That process 
cannot be abstracted in terms of the lives of decision-makers and 
opinion-shapers in the metropolises of the world.  Finally, legal 
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academics involved in the study of international human rights 
(including the many practitioners who act as such) have a profound 
obligation to engage with and encourage students in the particular-
istic exploration of the rich texts of the discourse, rather than in 
presenting the discourse as a Manichaean discipline in which 
invariably the good ―us‖ seek to eviscerate the barbarian ―them.‖ 
